In the central business environment in which it managed billions of dollars, registered Aftenposten multiple alarms that may indicate that false base stations were in use before July
In a few years, Barcode emerged as one of the most important financial institutions in Oslo.
Among other Norway’s largest bank DNB and one of the world’s largest network of accountants, advisers and lawyers PwC housed here.
tags on the front of Barcode
At the front of the Barcode buildings measured Aftenposten in December signals resembling actively monitoring equipment for mobiles.
Unlike measurements Aftenposten previously published from other places in Oslo, is the result of Bjørvika encumbered with greater uncertainty. The reason is that the measurement was made over a shorter time.
The measurements showed that a base station that appeared as a copy of a legal base station sends signals varied significantly between -56 and – 89 decibels.
Read also: Spy Equipment placed in the leading financial environment
Conducted own measurements
The National Communications Authority (formerly PT) has been sent to all the reports from Aftenposten and director Einar Lunde commenting overall material so:
– As previously pointed out, there will always be uncertainties such measurements in complex networks, but NK finds, based on the Aftenposten has demonstrated, reason attributing observations considerable weight. It is in our view likely that some of the observations can be linked to the use of false base stations, says Lunde.
– Any unauthorized use of equipment that could weaken the confidentiality of users’ communication is reason for concern with ecom authority. NK thus takes Aftenposten findings very seriously.
Aftenposten has published all the data from measurements in mobile espionage cases. The data can even enter HERE.
– No natural explanations
Lunde says that the National Communications Authority did own measurements in the Barcode December 20.
To reply he on the National Communications Authority know if there are natural explanations for the base station in the Barcode appeared so Aftenposten measurements show.
– Given that måleoppsettene as static location, direction, equipment and more are identical at the different time points, we have no natural explanation for this type of variation in the signal level.
– Does the National Communications Authority knowledge about some of the measurements Aftenposten has registered, due legal monitoring measures under the auspices of the Norwegian authorities?
– No.
Have had problems
Earlier it has been some major problems with mobile coverage by Oslo. Therefore, it set up several wall-based base stations to improve coverage, giving strong signals from some of the stations.
It makes it extra difficult to do research in this area.
Barcode is also close to several train lines. Sverre Knowing, technology director of Rail says it may be possible that the GSM-R signals (the railway closed mobile networks) are captured by measuring equipment Aftenposten, but GSM-R signals have not been changed significantly in strength or frequency in the area and time Aftenposten have measured.
See Aftenposten video on mobile espionage in Oslo:
PST: – The Norwegian people can not talk about secrets on open line
PwC: Thankful for measurements
– We are grateful that Aftenposten has taken the initiative to these measurements, which are an important issue for both government and business, and we have confidence that PST does a thorough investigation of the cases, says Einar Ravndal, head of marketing and communications at PwC.
– Is there relationship with you, legitimate security systems, special network conditions or other natural explanation that you think might turn out on these measurements?
– Not like our knowledge, says Ravndal.
DNB: Does dialogue with the police
DNB shows that the financial industry is a key part of society’s infrastructure, and the bank prioritizes information aloud.
– We have dialogue with the relevant police and security authorities related to the threat when it comes to such interception, and would not comment on the contents of this dialogue in the media, says Even Westerveld, Director of DNB.
How revealed Aftenposten monitoring
Many discrepancies discovered with CryptoPhone
Aftenposten has published all the raw data in the case of mobile spying in Oslo. The raw data Aftenposten published online shows that CryptoPhone measurements Aftenposten made in October and November registered many discrepancies that raises more questions newspaper has not managed to find the answer.
Both at Grønlandsleiret, Oslo Central Station, Skoyen, Helsfyr Lutvann, Kjeller and Sørkedalsveien in Oslo reacted the German-made, encrypted mobile unusual activity on mobile baseband.
These measurements are far more uncertain than measurements with counter intelligence equipment Falcon II and can not be used as evidence that it takes mobile monitoring.
Neither telecom companies, the police, PST or security authorities were interested in making further inquiries when Aftenposten presented their Cryptophone findings.
No mobile surveillance under
Nobel Prize Aftenposten examined whether false base stations could be active in connection with the peace ceremony in Oslo on December 9.
The measurements showed no effect suggesting that guests were subjected to systematic mobile surveillance. The only trick that was registered, lasted for a short period of 11 minutes and then disappear.
It may indicate that we caught up Effects of security measures related to the VIP people were transported in the area.
There is today a common safety using IMSI catchere related to transport, both to prevent eavesdropping and stop trying to trigger remote controlled bombs.
Utility Nydalen is probably due to natural explanations
Also in Nydalen area did Aftenposten measurements alarm outcomes, but at the lowest level.
Here keeps a number of large and important companies, as well as Ministry of Justice and Police Security Service.
In Nydalen took measurements over a short time. Thus it is more likely that the signals can be due to other explanations than the use of surveillance equipment.
Both Telenor, Tele2 and Netcom shows that they have no reason to believe that it is a fake base station operating Nydalen .
Thus, the impact caused by signal conditions and other explanations.
“Change in signal strength may be due to conditions such as measuring method and equipment – local signal reflections or use of illegal repeaters in that area” writes technical director John Christian Hillestad in TeliaSonera.
“In an urban environment like Nydalen will constantly be relatively large variations in what you measure if you are in motion and is in an area that many and about as strong base stations turn into “writes Tele2.
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