Therefore concludes experts that this is mobile espionage – Aftenposten

Four main findings enables intelligence experts extent are confident that false base stations have been active in Oslo.

The reason why it was technically possible to uncover it most probably was active mobile monitoring equipment in Oslo, is the false base stations emitted signals with information on both signal strength, neighbor stations and several other parameters.

This information was logged every four. second with the advanced counter intelligence equipment Falcon II and then compared with map data and information on the legal mobile network.

All base stations emit such information, so that mobile phones can move from one area to another, and all the time For best coverage.

Background: Parliament and the Prime Minister monitored and spy equipment placed in the leading financial environment

1. Duplicate cell identities:

Most fake base stations that have been operating in Oslo, copied identity of legal neighboring cells.

Thus emerged the as a replica of a real base station in the same area. But they appeared highly unusual.

The false transmitters sent moreover signals from places where they should not have stood, which appears when the measurement results are compared with the telecommunications companies’ own map of base stations.

– More of the cells we have measured signals are duplicated. It does not occur in the normal grid, says Kyrre Sletsjøe, CEO of Cepia Technologies, one of the two security companies Aftenposten has collaborated with. The company has highly precise measuring equipment for locating fake base stations.

Sletsjøe has long experience from Norwegian intelligence service and has assisted authorities in several other countries with similar equipment and research.

– The technical parameters one can see, is so obvious that we can determine with great certainty that this is signals from active systems. However, it is not inconceivable that configuring base stations in the regular grid that way, but it is very unusual, he said.

Watch video: How revealed Aftenposten monitoring signals:

How revealed Aftenposten monitoring

See what kind of technology that was used to show that mobiltelfoner in Oslo, monitored.

2. Some operated on two tape

At least two of the false base stations operated on two tapes.

This means that the same transmitter captured signals from mobile phones to both Telenor and Netcom customers further. This should not occur, since telecom companies have completely different base stations.

3. Significant differences in signal strength

The signals from the false base stations varied dramatically, and they differed thus from all the usual base stations in the area.

This is because the fake base stations trying to lure mobile phones from the ordinary, legitimate mobile network.

The false base stations linked moreover to his cell phones at very low signal levels, although they should ensure that mobile phones in the area were referred to other available base stations with far better service.

4. Unusual variations in “reseleksjonsverdiene” to the cells

Another important method is to look at “reseleksjonsverdiene”. This is information that the mobile receives from base stations in order to select the best base stations and constantly having network connector.

The measurements showed how “reseleksjonsverdiene” to the false base stations completely changed when they were active. They entered the mobile phones in the area that they should choose some other base stations in the area.

– All this is behavior that corresponded with mobile monitoring equipment, concludes CEPI Technologies, the British-Norwegian-Czech security company which, together with Norwegian Aeger Group has made measurements for Aftenposten.

– Very unusual

– Could this be natural sources of error?

– You can never be 100 percent sure. It can always be mistakes in the mobile network, such as a misconfigured base station. But it is very unusual to configure a base station to send signals with the technical parameters has been measured in this area, with a clear duplication of a cell ID. It does not occur in the normal grid, says Sletsjøe.

Both Telenor and Netcom says Aftenposten that there are no errors in their equipment in these areas.

Watch video: PST: – For us it is important to work on prevention and reducing vulnerability:

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See Aftenposten reveal how parts of mobile traffic in Oslo is being monitored.

Løwer: – Sensational and interesting

– As I see the matter, it is the amount of information and follow-up of earlier obtained documentation that is startling and interesting, says Eldbjørg Løwer.

She heads the Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Intelligence and Security Services (EOS Committee), which will now look at the material Aftenposten has collected about mobile surveillance in Oslo .

The Committee asks the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), National Security Authority (NSM) and the intelligence service information that may shed light on the results.

-Not received explanation

– It has now been three weeks since Aftenposten’s revelation. Have you got any answer on what kind of equipment that may have been deployed near their offices?

– We have not received any explanation of the discoveries made, and Aftenposten featured . But this is surveillance technology that is not unknown to us. We know that the equipment exists and that this is an opportunity that exists, says Løwer.

– We can not on its own initiative determine this. But we have been in contact with the Police Security Service, she says.

In addition prepares selection a separate issue to the first meeting.

– Moreover, we follow up with the services we are working with, to see what they can contribute, ie National Security Authority, PST and intelligence service.

– What can EOS Committee do to get to the bottom of this?

– It is our task to control what services have done with this. It’s part of our mandate, and something we have full access to do.

The reason that Aftenposten basically started investigations, was that no Norwegian authorities or telcos would advise how often mobile surveillance equipment in use from Norwegian side.

Police and PST currently have access to carry out so-called “temporary mass surveillance” but reporting this small degree to the National Communications Authority to electronic communications required by law.

-Should and will control

– Do you know the EOS Committee how often PST, NSM and police use IMSI catchere in Norway?

– This is something we can and should control. There is nothing that prevents us to find out how often this is used by the Norwegian authorities. Although we can not go out with classified information, we can mention this in our public report in a way that does not reveal classified information. Use of such equipment shall be submitted to the court in a proper way, like other equipment for communication control. We verify that this happens, and also examine the equipment disconnected in time, said Lower.

The Committee is in keeping with many businesses and public authorities looked at how they can protect themselves by Aftenposten disclosures.

– This case has been a sharpens, although we have no particular suspicion that we have been monitored.

Published: 04.jan. 2015 9:42 p.m.